Functionalism and structural functionalism
Table of content__________________________________
Introduction
Functionalism is
–
1. An ethnographic methodology distinctive
of cultural anthropology.
2. A historical school of anthropology
(also known as British school).
3. A school of sociology, which attempted
to integrate sociology, psychology, and anthropology.
4. A philosophy of social sciences in the
Anglo-American philosophical tradition.
Roots and basic premises
Underlying
functionalist theory is the fundamental metaphor of the living organism, its
several parts and organs, grouped and organized into a system, the function of
the various parts and organs being to sustain the organism, to keep its
essential processes going and enable it to reproduce.
Mentors:
Auguste Comte:
In trying to
legitimate the new discipline of sociology, Auguste Comte (1830–1842,
1851–1854) revived analogies made by the Greeks and, closer to his time, by Hobbes
and Rousseau that society is a kind of organism. In so doing, Comte effectively
linked sociology with the prestige of biological science. For functional
theory, then, society is like a biological organism that grows, and as a
consequence, its parts can be examined with respect to how they operate (or
function) to maintain the viability of the body social as it grows and
develops. Functionalist analyses therefore, examine the social significance of
phenomena, that is, the purpose they serve a particular society in maintaining
the whole (Jarvie 1973). As Comte emphasized (1851–1854, p. 239), there is a
‘‘true correspondence between Statistical Analysis of the Social Organism in
Sociology, and that of the Individual Organism in Biology’’ (1851–1854, p. 239).
Moreover, Comte went so far as to ‘‘decompose structure anatomically into
elements, tissues, and organs’’ (1851– 1854, p. 240) and to ‘‘treat the Social
Organism as definitely composed of the Families which are the true elements or
cells, next the Classes or Castes which are its proper tissues, and lastly, of
the cities and Communes which are its real organs’’ (pp. 211–212). Yet, since
these analogies were not systematically pursued by Comte, his main contribution
was to give sociology its name and to reintroduce organismic reasoning into the
new science of society.
Herbert Spencer:
Spencer used the
organismic analogy to create an explicit form of functional analysis. Drawing
upon materials from his monumental The Principles of Biology (1864–1867), Spencer’s
The Principles of Sociology (1874–1896) is filled with analogies between
organisms and society as well as between ecological processes (variation,
competition, and selection) and societal evolution (which he saw as driven by
war). Spencer did not see society as an actual organism; rather, he
conceptualized ‘‘superorganic systems’’ (organization of organisms) as
revealing certain similarities in their ‘‘principles of arrangement’’ to
biological organisms (1874–1896, part 2, pp. 451–462). In so doing, he
introduced the notion of ‘‘functional requisites’’ or ‘‘needs,’’ thereby
creating functionalism. For Spencer, there were three basic requisites of
superorganic systems: (1) the need to secure and circulate resources, (2) the
need to produce usable substances, and (3) the need to regulate, control, and
administer system activities (1874–1896, part 2, p. 477). Thus, any pattern of
social organization reveals these three classes of functional requisites, and
the goal of sociological analysis is to see how these needs are met in
empirical social systems.
Emile Durkheim:
Later
functionalists produced somewhat different lists of requisites. Émile Durkheim
argued that sociological explanations ‘‘must seek separately the efficient
cause [of a phenomenon]—and the function it fulfills’’ (1895, p. 96), but, in
contrast to Spencer, he posited only one functional requisite: the need for
social integration. For Durkheim, then, sociological analysis would involve
assessment of the causes of phenomena and their consequences or functions for
meeting the needs of social structures for integration.
Two major versions:
The initial
split between functionalists and structural functionalists began with two
pioneering sociologist philosophers, viz. Herbert Spencer who adopted what is
later termed as functionalism, and a second version by Emile Durkheim, later termed
as structural functionalism. Two versions of functionalism developed between
1910 and 1930: biocultural (or psychological) functionalism, the approach
advocated by Malinowski, and structural- functionalism, the approach advanced
by Radcliffe-Brown. With Radcliffe-Brown, Malinowski pushed for a paradigm
shift in British anthropology, a change from the speculative, historical to the
ahistorical study of social institutions. This theoretical shift gave rise to
functionalism and established fieldwork as the constitutive experience of
social anthropology (Kuper 1973, Young 1991).
Mentors:
Functionalism/ biocultural/ psychological functionalism:
A functional
explanation accounts for the existence of a phenomena or carrying out of an
action in terms of its consequences – its contribution to maintaining a stable
social whole.
Contributors:
Bronislaw Malinowski:
Polish, intellectual, aristocratic family Doctorate
in math & physics 1908, age 24 Inspired by Frazer's Golden Bough 1910
London School of Economics Ph.D. with C.G. Seligman (Torres Straits expedition)
1913, The Family Among Australian Aborigines Age 30, 2 doctorates, a book--no
fieldwork 1915 - 1918 Trobriand Islands.
Approach towards functionalism
Malinowski
suggested that individuals have physiological needs and that social
institutions develop to meet these needs. There are also culturally derived
needs and four basic "instrumental needs" (economics, social control,
education, and political organization), that require institutional devices.
Each institution has personnel, a charter, a set of norms or rules, activities,
material apparatus (technology), and a function. Malinowski believed that
uniform psychological responses are correlates of physiological needs. He
argued that satisfaction of these needs transformed the cultural instrumental
activity into an acquired drive through psychological reinforcement
(Goldschmidt 1996:510; Voget 1996:573).
Malinowskian explanation:
Malinowski's
functionalism is best discussed in relation to the Trobriand ethnography with
the aid of which it was developed. One theme here was the distinction between
magic, religion, and science, which Malinowski broadly took over from Frazer
(1890). In this view, science was empirical, rational knowledge, while magic
was reasoning from false premises, though both had instrumental purpose.
Malinowski detected both in Trobriand society, a derogation from Frazer's
placing of them at opposite ends of a simple evolutionary sequence that linked
but did not unify different societal types. This is connected with Malinowski's
further observation that while some rituals, such as healing, were means to an
end, others, such as the festival of Milamala (when ancestral spirits return
briefly from Tuma, the next world), were not. Further, the Trobrianders could
give a clear reason for the former, but could only refer the latter to
"custom." This also appears to be the distinction between magic and religion
for Malinowski, though he also grouped them together as being miraculous,
mythological, and linked with emotional stress. However, this was no picture of
the Trobrianders being sunk in fear and awe for most of their lives. On the
contrary, Malinowski regarded them as essentially practical and rational: it
was only when reason, the empirical and scientific, could no longer provide an
explanation that magic and religion was resorted to. Thus a Trobriander knew
how to build a canoe technologically, but to cope with the emotional stress of
going on a sea voyage into the unknown he needed magic and ritual. Similarly,
inshore fishing was a purely technical matter of no great consequence, but
open-sea fishing required magic. Religion, on the other hand, was essentially a
response to the fear of annihilation through death (cf. Milamala above), while myth
was important in providing a charter for present social norms and action,
especially as regards the points of tension in society (e.g., the fact that the
matrilineal rule of descent in Trobriand society meant that a man had to
support his sister's children as much as his own).
Malinowski produced a similar
psychological theory of needs in his treatment of kinship. Following Edward
Westermarck (1891), one of his teachers at the LSE, he postulated the universal
existence and primacy of the monogamous nuclear family, seeing it as the
location of the satisfaction of human needs, such as food, shelter, and
companionship. Further, he distinguished it from wider groupings, such as the clan,
which he thought was never a domestic institution, a separation later
articulated especially strongly by Meyer Fortes. The link between the two was
provided by his theory of the "extension of sentiments," namely, that
sentiments generated within the family were extended to more distant
relationships within the clan. This theory reappears in respect of how terms
for relatives are learned in infancy: the child learns to identify his
relatives by starting from the nearest and proceeding to more remotely related
ones, by an analogous process of extension from the nuclear family
outwards here, of knowledge as much as
sentiment. Generally, however, Malinowski was derisive of what he called
"kinship algebra"; this was part of his reaction to Rivers's approach
to kinship, which he felt was unduly reliant on the analysis of kinship
terminologies as well as of clan systems. Instead, he postulated that kinship
extensions were essentially metaphors, the real meaning being the primary one.
The extensionist view was to bear fruit in the later American school of
semantic analysis, led by Harold Scheffler and Floyd Lounsbury (1971).
SYNOPTIC
SURVEY OF BIOLOGICAL AND DERIVED NEEDS AND THEIR SATISFACTION IN CULTURE
|
Basic Needs (Individual)
|
Direct Responses (Organized, i.e.,
Collective)
|
Instrumental Needs
|
Responses to Instrumental Needs
|
Symbolic and Integrative Needs
|
Systems of Thought and Faith
|
|
Nutrition
(metabolism)
|
Commissariat
|
Renewal
of cultural apparatus
|
Economics
|
Transmission
of experience by means of precise, consistent principles
|
Knowledge
|
|
Reproduction
|
Marriage
and family
|
|
|
|
|
|
Bodily
comforts
|
Domicile
and dress
|
Characters
of behavior and their sanctions
|
Social
control
|
|
|
|
Safety
|
Protection
and defense
|
|
|
Means
of intellectual, emotional, and pragmatic control of destiny and chance
|
Magic
Religion |
|
Relaxation
|
Systems
of play and repose
|
Renewal
of personnel
|
Education
|
|
|
|
Movement
|
Set
activities and systems of communication
|
|
|
|
|
|
Growth
|
Training
and Apprenticeship
|
Organization
of force and compulsion
|
Political
organization
|
Communal
rhythm of recreation, exercise and rest
|
Art
Sports Games Ceremonial |
(SOURCE:
Malinowski’s Basic Human Needs as presented in Langness 1987:80)
Malinowski’s works:
Malinowski's
main work consists of his Trobriand ethnography, published piecemeal as a
series of separate studies, each treating a different theme. The first, Argonauts of the western Pacific (1922),
dealt with exchange through the Kula cycle and considerably influenced Marcel Mauss’s
(1954) exchange theory. The sexual life
of savages (1929) contains his views on the family, kinship, and marriage
(see also Malinowski 1930), and Coral
Gardens and Their Magic (1935) treats of the relationship between technique
and ritual in Trobriand gardening. Also important is the self-explanatory
collection Magic, science and religion (1948). The early The family among the Australian Aborigines (1913) is an application
of Westermarck's theories of the Family to published sources on Australia,
whereas the posthumously published collection A scientific theory of culture
(1944) is more explicitly theoretical. Mention should also be made of
Malinowski's personal diaries (1967) from the years he was in the field, which
were published posthumously by his second wife without his authority. They give
considerable insight into his state of mind in this period and are frequently
shocking because of his unsympathetic attitude toward the people with whom he
was living, which is quite at variance with his published writings.
Structural functionalism:
Structural
functionalism is one type of consensus theory it posits that society is based
on mutual agreements. It sees the creation and maintenance of shared values and
norms as crucial to society, and views social change as a slow, orderly
process. Examples of prominent consensus theorists include Auguste Comte, Émile
Durkheim, Radcliffe-Brown, Talcott Parsons, and Robert Merton. These theories
stand in contrast to conflict theories, such as those of Karl Marx, that view
the world as based on a system of oppressive hierarchies, social order at the
whim of dominant groups, and social change as rapid and disorderly resulting
from struggles between groups.
Contributors:
Talcott persons:
Although he had
published The Structure of Social Action in 1937, it was not until The Social System (1951) and Towards a General Theory of Action (1951)
were completed that Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) emerged as the most influential
contributor to structural functionalism. There are important differences in
Parsons’s major writings, but constant throughout his career was the ambition
to formulate a systematic general theory that he described as “… a conceptual
scheme for the analysis of social systems in terms of the action frame of
reference” (Parsons 1951: 3). For Parsons, the fundamental starting point for
constructing any scientifi c theory is to establish an abstract frame of reference.
In the scientifi c study of social action, the empirical basis for the frame of
reference is a group of interacting individuals (social actors). Social actors
have particular goals that they wish to achieve, and to realize those goals
they must take advantage of opportunities (means) that are available under a
particular set of conditions (situations). Parsons was clear that none of these
elements can be reduced to the others, and he sought to formulate an action
frame of reference for the study of social action that was capable of
accounting for the individual and situational factors motivating people to act
in the ways that they do.
The systems(structure) point of view:
He answered this
question from the viewpoint of structural functionalism and outlined what he
believed are its major tenets:
(1) Systems
are ordered and their parts are all interdependent.
(2) systems
tend toward a goal of equilibrium or self-maintenance;
(3) systems
may be either inert or change in an ordered manner;
(4) each
part of the system has an effect on the forms the other parts can take;
(5) systems
create and maintain boundaries separating them from their environments;
(6) allocation
and integration are necessary for a system to reach a certain state of equilibrium;
and
(7) systems
will tend toward self-maintenance by maintaining their boundaries,
the interdependent relationship among parts, and the relationship between
parts and the whole; by controlling variations in the environment; and by controlling
tendencies of the system to change from within.
The functions [AGIL scheme]:
In addition to
structures, Parsons was also concerned with functions. Parsons saw functions as
those activities that had the goal of fulfilling a need of the system. He
believed that there were four necessary functional imperatives of all systems: [A] adaptation (how a system copes with
its outside environment by both adapting to it and by adapting the environment
to meet the needs of the system), [G] goal
attainment (the definition and achievement of the primary goals of the system),
[I] integration (how the system
regulates the relationship of its various parts as well as the relationship
among the other three functional imperatives), and [L] latency, or pattern maintenance (how the system provides,
maintains, and rejuvenates the motivation of individuals and the cultural
patterns that stimulate and maintain that motivation). These functional
imperatives are known as Parsons’s AGIL scheme.
Functions become
integrated with systems in Parsons’s theory as each component of the AGIL
scheme is handled by a different system. Most generally, adaptation is handled
by the behavioral organism that adjusts to and transforms the outside world.
Goal attainment is handled by the personality system that defines the goals of
the system and mobilizes he necessary resources to reach outlined goals.
Integration is done by the social system that controls the various components
of the system. Latency is performed by the cultural system that provides
individuals with norms and values to motivate them to action.
Robert K. Merton:
Merton
(1910–2003) became one of Parsons’s most influential collaborators in the
structural functionalist orientation, but he also emerged as one of Parsons’s
most important critics. Merton believes that Parsons’s emphasis on developing
comprehensive theoretical systems did not facilitate the process of actually
doing sociological research. In contrast to the abstraction and deduction that
Parsons promotes, Merton argues that sociologists should work on testable and
researchable hypotheses in specific situations. He also argues that
sociologists should gradually develop theories from empirical evidence. What is
lacking in functional analysis, insists Merton, is an integration of theory and
research, a problem confounded by the failure in sociological discourse to
distinguish progressively between “the history of theory” and “the systematics
of theory.”
Functional explanation: the net balance
Merton defined
functions as those consequences that lead to the adjustment or adaptation of a
system. In addition, he argued that not all functions had positive consequences
and that some, in fact, were better described as dysfunctions. In addition,
nonfunctions are those consequences that have no effect at all on the system.
The development of dysfunctions and nonfunctions to complement the existing
theory of functions led Merton to develop the idea of a net balance. A net
balance is an understanding of the relative weight of functions and
dysfunctions in a given system. It is more of a theoretical orientation then an
empirical tool because the magnitude and evaluation of what constitutes
functions and dysfunctions are highly subjective. The issue of how to study a
net balance led Merton to the idea of levels of functional analysis. He argued
that society did not have to be studied as a whole but those organizations,
groups, and other subcomponents of society were also valid as research topics.
Merton, in fact, was a proponent of “middle-range” theories. Thus, what is the
net balance of those functions, and dysfunctions, at one level may well be
different at another level.
Manifest and latent functions:
Another valuable
contribution of Merton to the field of structural functionalism was the idea of
manifest and latent functions. Manifest functions are those that are intended,
whereas latent functions are those that are unintended yet still functional for
the system. Closely related to the idea of latent functions is that of
unanticipated consequences, although this term encompasses not only those
unintended consequences that are functional for the system but also those that
are dysfunctional and nonfunctional as well. In sum Latent functions are those
objective consequences of a cultural item which are neither intended nor
recognized by the members of a society. Manifest functions are those objective
consequences contributing to the adjustment or adaptation of the system which
are intended and recognized by participants in the system (Kaplan and Manners
1972:58).
Kingsley Davis and Wilbert Moore:
In1945, they
wrote what is perhaps the best-known piece of structural functional literature on
the topic of social stratification. They argued that a system of stratification
is not only functional but also necessary for societies to persist and remain
healthy. This idea led them to argue that a classless society had never existed
because the need for a system of stratification had always created such a
system. They did not, however, believe that the creation of such a stratified
system was always a conscious undertaking on the part of society but, rather,
that it could be, and often was, an “unconsciously evolved device.”
Following their
structural functional orientation, Davis and Moore saw stratification in
society not in terms of people but in terms of positions. This meant that they
were primarily interested in how certain positions came to be ranked higher or
lower than other positions, not in how certain individuals came to fill those
ranked positions. They did believe, however, that one of the biggest problems
faced by society was how to get the right people to fill the right positions
and then, more important, how to keep them there. Their argument was that some
positions in society are more pleasant to occupy, some are more crucial for the
health and continuity of the society as a whole, and different types of
positions require different types of knowledge and skills. Those positions that
are generally attributed with a higher social ranking (e.g., politicians,
bankers, lawyers) are not as pleasant to occupy, are more important to the
overall health of society, and require the highest level of skill and
education. Consequently, it is these positions that must also carry the highest
level of social prestige, monetary compensation, and available leisure time.
A.R. Radcliffe-Brown:
Born 1881, Educated
at Cambridge, Fieldwork 1906 - 1908, Andaman Islands, Influenced by
Durkheim--rewrote his thesis Published The
Andaman Islanders in 1922, 1910 - 1912
Western Australia, 1916 - 1919
Tonga, then South Africa and Australia University of Chicago, 1931.
Approach towards structural functionalism:
Radcliffe-Brown
focused attention on social structure. He suggested that a society is a system
of relationships maintaining itself through cybernetic feedback, while
institutions are orderly sets of relationships whose function is to maintain
the society as a system. Radcliffe-Brown, following Auguste Comte, believed
that the social constituted a separate "level" of reality distinct
from those of biological forms and inorganic matter. Furthermore, he believed
that explanations of social phenomena had to be constructed within the social
level. He believed that individuals were replaceable, transient occupants of social
roles. Unlike Malinowski's emphasis on individuals, Radcliffe-Brown considered
individuals irrelevant (Goldschmidt 1996:510).
Drawing influence from Durkheim sets
his goal of investigation as Compare social structure cross-culturally. He felt
that culture was a particularly useful mode of investigation. What was
important was not what indigenes were thinking or believed, but how they
behaved and what structural features shaped this. This derived from his
positivism, that is to say he stressed observable social facts rather than
abstract ideas. Social structure was the network of actual social relations. Given
his attempt at scientific rigor his anthropology was a nomothetic inquiry. The
search for laws and generalisations was paramount and it is not surprising that
he launched telling attacks on what he called ‘conjectural history,’ the mode
of reconstructing cultural history so popular among theorists who sought to
explain non-functional customs as ‘survivals’ from an earlier epoch.
Radcliffe-Brown believed that employing an inductivist and supposedly
empiricist approach could develop natural laws of society – he made much of
verifiable facts and observations – and comparisons. Such an approach he
believed could lead to a single unified social science. His articulate espousal
of positivism, done with exceptional economy and clarity at a time when many
believed that a scientific anthropology was attainable, led to a cult like
status Indeed he did much to ingrain the notion that fieldwork was of a lower status
than the comparative analysis of other people’s ethnographies of what he had an
outstanding knowledge. He investigated what principles account for different
structures which in turn Leads to function which is to investigate How do
structures maintain society? For him Function is the role of structure in
social continuity. He stated that Social system (society) has a functional
unity: All parts work together well enough to maintain society. As the
traditional societies studied by early anthropologists were generally without a
written history, anthropologists were confronted with the problem of explaining
the existence of activities and structures in these societies. The explanatory
problem became particularly acute in the post–World War I period with the
demise of evolutionism and diffusionism as deciphering tools (Turner and
Maryanski 1979). Functional analysis provided a novel alternative: Analyze
structures such as kinship or activities such as rituals in terms of their
functions for maintaining the society. It was A. R. Radcliffe-Brown ([1914]
1922, 1924, 1935, 1952) who sustained the Durkheimian tradition by emphasizing
the importance of integrative needs and then analyzing how structures—most
notably kinship systems—operate to meet such integrative requisites.
In order to
break with the older mode of anthropology, and as a tribute to Durkheim’s
influence, he labelled his interests comparative sociology rather than
anthropology Together with some of the ideas propounded by Malinowski this
approach is often seen as the basis for what becccame known as Structural-Functional anthropology. This
very abstract theoretical formulation displayed a number of characteristics.
All customs served a functional purpose. Its key metaphor was the organic
analogy that compared society to a biological organism, which was derived from
Spencer and Durkheim. Everything was interrelated and changing one part would
result ina ripple effect. Except at such timings of change, it was assumed that
society existed in equilibrium. Ultimately, distortions would self re-adjust,
and following from this it was implied that societies were normally static.
More than Malinowski, he seemed aware of the potential flaws of Functionalism. Certainly he did not
naively be,ieve that every custom had had a positive function, noting that
people could be bonded together by shared hatred as much as by shared love, and
in later life he proved to be quite amenable to historical studies His
theoretical musings had a significant influence beyond anthropology on
sociologists such as Kingsley Devis and Robert K. Merton.
Criticisms:
structural
functionalism has also been critiqued by many in the field. A number of the
more noteworthy critiques include (1) that it is ahistorical (it did in fact
develop in reaction to the historical evolutionary approach of many
anthropologists at that time); (2) it is unable to deal with contemporary
processes of social change; (3) it cannot adequately deal with conflict (it is
generally viewed as a consensus theory and hence in contradiction to conflict
theory); (4) it has a conservative bias that maintains the status quo and the
dominating power of the elite class; (5) it is generally too abstract, vague,
and ambiguous to bear much relationship to the real world; (6) the theories are
too grand and ambitious when more historically and situation relevant theories
might be more appropriate; (7) there are inadequate methods to research the
questions of interest; and (8) comparative analysis is virtually impossible.
Turner and
Maryanski (1979) also saw the problems of teleology and tautology plaguing
structural functionalism. More specifically, they saw illegitimate teleology as
a problem. It is legitimate to assume that society has certain goals and that
it brings certain structures and functions into creation to achieve these
goals. What many structural functionalists do, however, that is illegitimate is
to assume that the current structures and functions in society are the only
ones that could have been created to achieve these goals. In addition,
tautology is a problem because both the whole and its parts are defined in
terms of the other. The whole is defined in terms of its parts and the various
parts are then defined in terms of the whole. Hence, neither is truly defined
at all.
Further reading:
Related articles in this blog:
Functionalism - the basic anthhropological idea - click here
Basic theories - click here
ü Alexander, Jeffrey C., ed. 1985. Neofunctionalism. Beverly Hills , CA
ü Bourgatta, E.F. and Montgomery New York
ü Camic, Charles. 1992. “Reputation and Predecessor Selection: Parsons and the Institutionalists.” American Journal of Sociology 57: 421–445.
ü Davis, Kingsley. 1959. “The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology.” American Sociological Review 24: 757–772.
ü Kroeber, Alfred L., and Talcoo Parsons. 1958. “The Concept of Culture and of Social System.” American Sociological Review 23: 582–583.
ü Ritzer, G. (Ed.). Encyclopaedia of social theory, vol – 2. Thousand Oaks
ü http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/functionalism/#WhaFun (Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy)
ü http://www.as.ua.edu/ant/cultures/cultures.php?culture=Functionalism (Murphy’s collection of anthropological materials)
ü www.soci.canterbury.ac.nz/resources/biograph/parsons.shtml (Talcott persons biography)
ü www.2fmg.uva.nl/sociosite/topics/sociologists.html (Famous sociologists)
ü www.faculty.rsu.edu~felwell/Theorists/Merton (Merton’s functional analaysis)
ü www.bolender.com/Sociological%20Theory/Parsons,%20Talcoo/parsons,_talcoo.htm (all about parsons)
Brief introduction to functionalism and structural functionalism
